A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions

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Abstract
We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we require that they maintain a capital cushion sufficiently great that their own credit default swap price stays below a threshold level. If this level is violated the LFI regulator forces the LFI to issue equity until the CDS price moves back below the threshold. If this does not happen within a predetermined period of time, the regulator intervenes. We show that this mechanism ensures that LFIs are solvent with probability one, while preserving the disciplinary effects of debt.

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1. Introduction

If there is one lesson to be learned from the 2008 financial crisis, it is that large financial institutions (LFIs) are too big to fail. The too-big-to-fail doctrine has been around for a long time (Stern and Feldman, 2004), but its practical value has often been questioned (Meltzer, 2004). The backlash following the demise of Lehman Brothers, and the effort exerted to save major financial institutions at all costs, has established that the United States does not have the political will to let large financial institutions fail. Whether the too-big-to-fail doctrine is based on economic thinking (the cost of large LFI failure is too high) or political reality (the pressure to save LFIs is too strong), the conclusion is the same: we need to rethink how we regulate these institutions.

Traditionally, bank capital regulation has been thought of as a corollary to the introduction of deposit insurance. The existence of this insurance makes debt a cheap source of financing for banks. Depositors and other creditors will lend at low interest rates because they know that their debts are secure: they will be repaid by the bank if things go well, and by the government if things go badly. Capital requirements, then, are a necessary evil to prevent banks from abusing the ability to borrow cheaply, over-leverage, and dump large losses onto taxpayers. The Basle Accords, for instance, require banks to hold some minimal capital level to protect deposits against the risk of fluctuations in the value of bank assets. That the Basle Accords were aimed at protecting deposits and not at avoiding bank bankruptcies is suggested by the fact that Tier 2 capital ratios include long-term debt. Obviously, long-term debt provides a safety cushion for deposits but not insurance against bankruptcy.

In the United States, the traditional capital requirement was not applied to investment banks, in spite of their size, because they had no insured deposits. The events of Fall 2008 have shown the futility of this distinction. In spite of not having deposits, investment banks experienced a loss of confidence from their short-term creditors, and, because of the alleged systemic implications of this event, they were rescued by the Federal Government.

Shielding an LFI from bankruptcy has a cost. In a market economy bankruptcy accomplishes several important goals for a financially distressed company. It allows an efficient choice to be made between reorganization and liquidation; it penalizes
incumbent management and shareholders; and it resolves conflicting claims. But for LFIs, bankruptcy may be dangerous. When a LFI goes bankrupt its contracts (including all the hedges established with other parties) are put in jeopardy, and other LFIs can suffer because they suddenly find their positions unhedged. Reconstituting their hedges overnight can be prohibitively expensive, pushing other LFIs into bankruptcy, and leading to systemic failure.

Therefore, if we want to maintain a system of private financial institutions that are too big to fail, we need a mechanism that performs the same functions as bankruptcy but without the drawbacks. The goal of this paper is to devise such a mechanism.

Our mechanism mimics the way margin calls function. In a margin account an investor buys some stock, putting down only part of the cost. When the stock price drops, the broker who extended the loan asks the investor to post additional collateral. The investor can choose between posting new collateral (and in so doing re-establishing the safety of the position) or having his position liquidated (which allows the creditors to be paid in full). In other words, with a dynamic system of margin calls, the broker minimizes the amount of collateral posted by the investor, while at the same time ensuring that the debt is paid with probability one.

Our capital requirement system works in a similar way. LFIs will post enough collateral (equity) to ensure that the debt (all the debt not just the deposits and derivative contracts) is paid in full with probability one. When the fluctuation in the value of the underlying assets puts debt at risk, LFI equityholders are faced with a margin call and they must either inject new capital or lose their equity. There are two main differences between margin calls and our new capital requirement system: the trigger mechanism and the action taken if the trigger is activated. In a margin account the broker looks at the value of the investments (which is easily determined since all assets are traded) and compares the value of the collateral posted with the possible losses the position might have in the following days. If the collateral is insufficient to cover an adverse movement in the value of the position, the broker calls for more collateral. In the LFI case, the value of investments (i.e., the value of the LFI’s assets) is not easily determinable, because the underlying assets—commercial loans and home equity lines, for example—are not standardized and not frequently traded. Thus it is not easy to determine when the margin
is too thin to protect the existing debt. In addition, debtholders are often dispersed and so unable to coordinate a margin call. If a margin call approach is to be followed, we need to find an easily observable trigger.

To solve this problem we rely on the credit default swap (CDS) market. A credit default swap on an LFI is an insurance claim that pays off if the LFI fails and creditors are not paid in full. Since the CDS is a “bet” on the institution’s strength, its price reflects the probability that the debt will not be repaid in full. In essence, the CDS indicates the risk that the LFI will fail. In our mechanism, when the CDS price rises above a critical threshold, the regulator forces the LFI to issue equity until the CDS price moves back below the threshold. If this does not happen within a predetermined period of time the regulator intervenes. (The role of the regulator represents the second difference from a standard margin call system.) The regulator first determines whether the LFI debt is at risk. If the debt is not at risk (i.e., the CDS prices were inaccurate), then the regulator declares the company adequately capitalized and to prove it injects some government money. If the debt is at risk, the regulator replaces the CEO with a receiver (or trustee), who recapitalizes and sells the company, ensuring in the process that shareholders are wiped out and creditors receive a haircut.

This regulatory takeover is similar to a milder form of bankruptcy, and it achieves the goals of bankruptcy (discipline on the investors and management) without imposing any of the costs (systemic effects).

One of the advantages of our approach is that it is easily applicable to all financial institutions regardless of their organizational structure. One of the weaknesses of the current capital requirement system is that it applied only to certain types of institutions (commercial banks, but not investment banks or hedge funds), creating ample opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. In contrast, our rule can be applied to all financial institutions holding assets in excess of a predetermined threshold ($200 billion, say).

Our capital requirement mechanism resembles in some respects one proposed by Flannery (2005). In his case, however, the debt is converted into equity when the value of equity becomes close to zero. This solution has three potential shortcomings. First, it is too lenient toward management, eliminating one of the disciplinary effects of debt. Second, it can have perverse effects: the manager talking down the stock so as to obtain
more slack. Third, it generates a multiplicity of equilibria, some of which are inefficient. Our proposal is also related to that of Kashyap et al. (2008), who devise a form of state contingent insurance to inject capital in the banking sector during a systemic crisis. The two proposals have in common that they both rely on a contingent capital rule. They differ, however, because our proposal relies only on firm-level information, while their proposal depends on aggregate information. We discuss the differences further below. Finally, our market-based trigger is related to various proposals to use subordinated debt as a signal of a bank solvency (see, e.g., Calomiris (1999) and, for a comprehensive survey, Evanoff and Wall (2000)). While the idea of using the market to collect information is common to both sets of proposals, the mechanism and the trigger differ. If we want to avoid bankruptcy with probability one, subordinated debt as a signal of a bank solvency will not work, because it is always safe. In addition, as we explain in Section 4, CDSs have several advantages as a trigger mechanism.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the framework. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 provides further discussion of our mechanism and describes how it would work in practice. Section 5 concludes.

2. Framework

Consistent with the existing banking literature, we distinguish between “systemically relevant” obligations and “non-systemically relevant” ones; we refer to the latter as financial debt. If there exists any economic logic to the “too big to fail” argument, this logic resides in the fact that financial institutions are highly interconnected through derivative and repo contracts and thus the default of one might trigger the default of others. Specifically, we suppose that short-term interbank borrowing and the network of derivative contracts, as well as bank deposits, are systemically relevant obligations; while bonds are non-systemically relevant. For the purpose of our paper, we take the set of systemically relevant obligations as given and study only the choice of the level of financial debt. This is clearly a partial approach, and it raises the question of why some contracts are systemically relevant and how their level is determined. We plan to return to this issue in future work.
There are several reasons why banks and other large financial institutions issue financial debt on top of systemically relevant debt. First, as noted above, debt may be cheap given that it is implicitly backed by the government. Second, debt has certain tax advantages. Third, debt reduces agency costs.

In our model we focus on this last reason—the agency benefits of debt—but the thrust of our analysis carries through regardless of the motive for issuing financial debt. To model the agency benefits of debt in a very simple manner we assume that the LFI manager can “steal” a fraction $\lambda$ of the cash flow available after having paid down the debt. One possible interpretation of this assumption is that managers can pay themselves large bonuses as long as the firm does not become insolvent afterwards. If the company becomes insolvent, then the managers risk losing their bonuses because creditors can try to reclaim them through a fraudulent conveyance suit.¹

The primary goal of regulation is to avoid an LFI default on systemically relevant obligations. However, we take a more conservative view. We suppose that bankruptcy is sufficiently costly that in equilibrium the regulator wants to avoid a default on any debt—financial debt as well as systemically relevant debt.²

For simplicity we consider a two-period model with the structure displayed in Figure 1, where the $p_i$ indicate the probabilities of the various branches.

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¹ The New York’s “fraudulent conveyance” statute gives creditors the right to recover a payment to an insider if “the paying firm (1) did not receive fair consideration for the payment and (2) at the time had unreasonably small capital for its business operations” (Fried (2008)). Similarly, the 2005 “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act” introduced the possibility of clawing back executive bonuses paid in the last two years under the fraudulent conveyance rule or in the last year under the preference-payment rule. In the early 1990s the Resolution Trust Corporation sued former employees of Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., seeking the return of more than $250 million of bonuses paid. Many Drexel employees agreed to surrender a portion of their bonus. This situation is not unique to the United States. Thorburn (2004) finds that in 23% of the Swedish bankruptcy cases she studies there are fraudulent conveyance claims, with successful recovery in two thirds of the cases. In 86% of the cases where fraud is alleged the transfer has been made to insiders.

² In setting up the problem this way we are implicitly assuming an infinite social cost of a failure. To relax this unappealing assumption we would need to model the costs of systemic and non-systemic failure. We plan to study this in future work.
Figure 1

If we set the level of systemically relevant debt, which arises mostly from operational decisions, equal to $SD_i$, we can rewrite the net cash flow of the firm as

$$V_i = X_i - SD_i,$$

where the $X_i$ are the gross cash flows. From now on we focus on the $V_i$. We suppose that $V_1 > V_2 > V_3 > V_4$.

In our model the firm’s capital structure consists of a choice of long-term debt $D$ due at time 2 (we will discuss the possibility of short-term debt in Section 4.3). We assume that the capital structure is set in a value maximizing way at time zero as a result of some takeover threat or coordinated effort by large shareholders. At time 1 the LFI manager can modify the capital structure by issuing equity only if he has shareholders’ approval. At time 2 the company pays out the cash flow $V_i$ with $i = 1, \ldots, 4$ according to the state, and terminates. The market is supposed to be risk neutral, and the interest rate is zero.

In the absence of any (financial) debt the market value of the LFI net of the systemic obligations (which we label $V^U$, i.e., value of the unlevered firm) would be

$$V^U = (1 - \lambda)[p_1p_2V_1 + p_1(1 - p_2)V_2 + (1 - p_1)p_3V_3 + (1 - p_1)(1 - p_3)V_4].$$

If we introduce debt $D$, due at date 2, such that $V_4 < D < V_3$, then the market value of the debt $V^D$ at issue will be

$$V^D = [p_1p_2 + p_1(1 - p_2) + (1 - p_1)p_3]D + (1 - p_1)(1 - p_3)V_4,$$

and the total value (net of the systemic debt) of the levered LFI ($V^L$) will be
\[ V^L = V^U + \lambda [p_1 p_2 + p_1 (1 - p_2) + (1 - p_1) p_3] D + \lambda (1 - p_1)(1 - p_2) V_4. \]

Not surprisingly, since we assumed that there is a benefit, but not a cost, of debt, the value of a LFI is monotonically increasing in the level of debt outstanding. Strictly speaking, the above formula applies only for \( V_4 < D < V_3 \), but the same reasoning extends to all intervals. As a result, a value-maximizing LFI left to its own devices will pick a debt level equal to \( V_1 \), which would lead to bankruptcy with probability one.

We could, of course, qualify this extreme result by introducing a cost of debt for the LFI. Instead, however, we will introduce a social cost of debt. In particular, we will assume that the costs of the LFI’s bankruptcy are so great that bankruptcy must be avoided with probability 1.\(^3\)

To ensure no risk of bankruptcy a regulator could impose a debt level less than or equal to \( V_4 \). However, this would impose a high cost for the LFI, which will lose \( \lambda [p_1 p_2 + p_1 (1 - p_2) + (1 - p_1) p_3] (D - V_4) \) in value.

The question then is whether there exists a contingent capital requirement such that the value of the LFI is above
\[ V^L = V^U + \lambda V_4, \]
but debt is paid with probability one. In the next section we will show that this is possible. We start by assuming that at time 1 the states of the world are observable and verifiable (i.e., everyone knows whether we went along the upper branch of the tree or the lower one). We then relax this assumption and show how such a rule is implementable even if the states of the world are not verifiable, as long as there is an active market for credit default swaps.

3. Main Results

3.1 The States of the World are Verifiable

In this section we allow capital requirements to be state contingent. However, we assume that the initial debt level \( D \) is not state-contingent.

\(^3\) We do not consider mechanisms that use taxpayers’ money to bail out the LFI in equilibrium.
Consider a time-zero debt level $D$ (due at date 2) such that $V_4 < D < V_5$. Then, if at time 1 the realization is positive (upper branch of the tree), the debt is not at risk and nothing needs to be done. If the realization is negative (lower branch of the tree), then the debt starts to become risky and the LFI receives a margin call, i.e., it is forced to raise more equity. In order for the debt to return to being riskless, the LFI must raise $y \equiv D - V_4$. However, by diluting the entire value of existing equityholders, the LFI can raise at most $p_3(1 - \lambda)(V_3 + y - D)$.

Hence feasibility requires

$$p_3(1 - \lambda)(V_3 + y - D) \geq y,$$

which implies that for a debt level $D$ to be made riskless through a margin call it must satisfy

$$D \leq V_4 + p_3(1 - \lambda)(V_3 - V_4). \tag{2}$$

The value of the LFI at time zero can be calculated as the expected value of the time-2 payoffs minus the expected value of the additional equity issue, or

$$V^L = (1 - \lambda)[p_1p_2(V_1 - D) + p_1(1 - p_2)(V_2 - D) + (1 - p_1)p_3(V_3 + y - D)] + D - (1 - p_1)y.$$

Substituting the value of $y$ we obtain

$$V^L = V^U + p_3\lambda D + (1 - p_1)\lambda V_4. \tag{3}$$

Since (3) is increasing in the debt level $D$, it will be optimal for the LFI to set $D$ at the maximum level compatible with the financing constraint (2). Substituting this level in (3) and rearranging we obtain the maximized value of the LFI $\hat{V}^L$:

$$\hat{V}^L = V^U + \lambda V_4 + \lambda p_3(1 - \lambda)(V_3 - V_4). \tag{4}$$

Equation (4) has an easy interpretation. In a levered firm debt prevents managerial stealing. Since in all states of the world there is at least $V_4$ in debt, the second term ($\lambda V_4$) represents the stealing prevented in all states of the world. With probability $p_1$ the higher debt level remains in place and this will prevent some further stealing. Since in these cases the debt level exceeds $V_4$ by $p_3(1 - \lambda)(V_3 - V_4)$, and stealing occurs at rate $\lambda$, this explains the third term. With probability $(1 - p_1)$ at time 1 we find ourselves in the lower
branch of the tree. Since in these cases the debt level must be brought down to $V_4$ to avoid default, there is no additional stealing prevented in these states of the world. Thus, there is no additional term.

Since (4) is clearly larger than (1), we have:

Result 1: If we require a LFI never to fail, a contingent capital allocation yields a higher market value for the LFI than a non-contingent capital allocation.

Equation (4) also provides us with a nice intuition for the conditions that will make a LFI with a contingent capital structure more valuable than a LFI with a non-contingent capital structure. If we interpret $(V_3 - V_4)$ as a measure of the volatility of the underlying assets, we have that the higher the volatility, the higher is the difference between (4) and (1). Similarly, for a low level of agency costs $\lambda$ ($\lambda < 1/2$), the larger the size of the agency problem $\lambda$, the larger is the difference between (4) and (1). For a high level of agency costs this relationship is inverted because the amount of extra borrowing the LFI can undertake with a contingent capital structure is limited by the difficulty of raising additional equity, which is not worth a lot when agency costs are high. Finally, a contingent capital structure is more preferable the more likely is the good case scenario (i.e., the higher $p_1$ and $p_2$ are).

We should emphasize that our mechanism does not achieve the first-best. There is a real cost of preventing bankruptcy with probability 1: the largest debt the bank can have is $D = V_4 + p_3(1 - \lambda)(V_3 - V_4)$ rather than $D = V_1$, and so there will be more stealing in equilibrium than in the first-best. If society is willing to put up with a positive probability of bankruptcy, then a higher debt level can be supported. In fact it is easy to show that as the constraint on the probability of bankruptcy is weakened sufficiently the first-best for the LFI (if not for society) is achieved under our mechanism.

3.2 The States of the World are Not Verifiable

So far we have assumed that the states of the world are verifiable and that the regulator can write a state contingent rule. This is clearly unrealistic. In fact, the very problem of a
contingent capital requirement is how to make this rule implementable in a world where neither the regulator nor (many of) the debtholders know what the true value of the LFI’s assets is.

While the value of LFI assets is not verifiable, there are several claims on these assets that are generally traded and whose prices can be easily verified: a common stock, bonds, a short-term interest rate, and a credit default swap. If markets are efficient these prices should incorporate what informed traders know about the value of the LFI’s assets. In this section we will focus on credit default swaps and show that the contingent capital requirement derived in Section 3.1 is implementable by relying on this instrument alone. In the next section we will discuss possible alternatives.

As for the margin requirement, it is necessary to determine not only when the margin will be called, but also what happens if the margin call is not answered in a timely fashion. In our case, we assume that if new equity is not raised (or is not raised in a sufficient amount), so that the trigger remains activated for a relatively extended period of time (let’s say a month), then the regulator will intervene. When the regulator intervenes, we assume the following procedure. First, the regulator determines whether the LFI debt is at risk. If the debt is not at risk (i.e., the CDS prices were inaccurate), then the regulator declares the company adequately capitalized and to prove it injects a predetermined amount of cash (as a percentage of assets) in the form of debt that is pari passu with respect to existing financial debt. If the regulator determines that the debt is at risk, the regulator replaces the CEO with a receiver (or trustee), who wipes out the existing equity and debt (keeping in place systemically relevant obligations, such as derivative contracts or bank deposits); recapitalizes and sells the LFI for cash within a reasonable period of time (possibly through a public offering); and distributes the proceeds according to absolute priority, ensuring that creditors are not fully repaid, and that shareholders receive nothing (anything left over goes to the government). We assume that the case where the regulator determines that the debt is at risk constitutes a “default” as far as the CDS market is concerned.4

4 We have specified that, if the regulator determines that the debt is at risk, the receiver should sell the LFI for cash. However, one could imagine that the receiver might behave differently, e.g., he could carry out a reorganization via a debt-equity swap. Our early warning system, based on a threshold for the CDS price, generalizes to these other approaches.
We assume a timing as in Figure 2. After the realization of the first shock at date 1, the manager has the option to raise equity. After this decision has been made market prices are observed. At this point the regulator has the option to intervene before the second shock is realized. At date 2 the second shock is realized.

**Figure 2: Timing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First shock is realized</th>
<th>LFI decides whether to issue equity</th>
<th>Market price of CDS observed</th>
<th>Authority decides whether to intervene</th>
<th>Second shock is realized at date 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The CDS is a contract that promises to exchange a bond with an amount of cash equal to the bond’s notional value in the event of default (which, if our scheme is in place, would include receivership). The price of this contract in basis points \( p_{\text{CDS}} \) is the insurance premium paid every year on a notional amount of $100 of debt. By arbitrage the CDS price equals

\[
\frac{p_{\text{CDS}}}{10000} = \pi(1 - \text{recovery rate})
\]

where \( \pi \) is the (risk neutral) probability of default and the recovery rate is the proportion of the value of the debt recovered in the event of a default.

**Proposition 1:**
Assume \( D \leq V_4 + p_3(1 - \lambda)(V_3 - V_4) \). Then the equilibrium price of a CDS \( p_{\text{CDS}} \) will be greater than zero if and only if the lower branch of the tree is followed and the LFI raises equity with value less than \( D - V_4 \) at date 1.

**Proof:**
Suppose that the lower branch is followed and the LFI raises equity less than \( D - V_4 \).

Then it cannot be a rational expectations equilibrium for the regulator not to intervene. The reason is that there is then a positive probability that the debt will not be paid at date 2, and the CDS price will reflect this. Suppose instead that the market expects the
regulator to intervene. The regulator will find that the LFI is under-capitalized, and so he will reorganize the LFI, imposing a cost on the debt-holders. Since the creditors receive a haircut, the initial debt will not be fully repaid and the CDS price will be positive. Thus the unique rational expectations equilibrium is for the CDS price to be positive and for the regulator to intervene.

Consider next the case where the lower branch is followed and the LFI raises equity greater than or equal to \( D - V_4 \). Then if the regulator intervenes he will find that the debt is not at risk and he will invest some funds in the form of debt, which is pari passu with respect to the existing financial debt. The injection of cash will make the debt even safer. The debt is also not at risk if the regulator does not intervene. Thus the unique rational expectations equilibrium in this case is for the CDS price to be zero and for the regulator not to intervene.

Consider finally the case where the upper branch of the tree is followed. Then the debt is not at risk, and so the unique rational expectations equilibrium is one where the CDS price is zero and the regulator does not intervene. Q.E.D.

Proposition 1 ensures that the CDS price is a perfect indicator of when the regulator needs to intervene. Anticipating the behavior of the CDS price and hence of the regulator, the CEO of a LFI will always prefer to issue equity of value \( D - V_4 \) when the first period realization is negative: if he does not, the CDS price will be positive, the regulator will intervene, and the CEO will lose his job. The equity-holders will agree to let him issue equity since they will be wiped out if he does not (and, as long as the threshold level for the CDS price is strictly positive, the manager can issue slightly less equity than \( D - V_4 \), so that there is something left for initial equityholders). Note that if the CEO tries to issue equity when the first period realization is positive--which he would like to do since this increases slack and stealing possibilities--the equity-holders, knowing that the CDS price will be zero even without the new equity, will turn him down.

It follows from Proposition 1 that the optimal debt level for shareholders to put in place at date 0 is \( D = V_4 + p_3 (1 - \lambda)(V_3 - V_4) \), as in Section 3.1. Note that if they set \( D > V_4 + p_3 (1 - \lambda)(V_3 - V_4) \), then the market will realize at date 0 that there is a risk of
bankruptcy, the date 0 CDS price will be positive, and the regulator will intervene right away.\textsuperscript{5}

\section*{4. Discussion}

\subsection*{4.1 An implementable rule}

Taken at face value, the model suggests an intervention every time the CDS price is above zero. This is clearly very impractical. First, if the price of the instrument is always equal to zero the instrument would hardly be traded. Second, in the real world no institution is perfect. For example, it is reasonable to assume that the regulator might make some mistakes and occasionally classify an adequately capitalized institution as not adequately capitalized and vice versa. As long as these mistakes are non-systematic, it is sufficient to have a rule with some flexibility. Consider for instance a rule that says that intervention is triggered whenever the CDS price is above 100 bps for at least 20 of the last 30 trading days. Assuming a loss upon default of 40\%, this trigger would correspond to accepting a maximum risk neutral probability of default equal to 2.5\%.

This rule will make the mechanism robust to speculation. Suppose that a bear raid is launched to drive the CDS price above the threshold, so as to trigger the mechanism and profit from it. If the regulator is perfect, the speculation will not pay off, because the regulator will find that the LFI is adequately capitalized and nothing will happen. If the regulator makes occasional mistakes, however, and, let’s say, 5\% of the time classifies as not adequately capitalized an institution that is, is there a risk of a self-fulfilling bear raid?

Suppose the haircut imposed on creditors is 20\%. Then, if the LFI is adequately capitalized, a speculator will be unwilling to drive the CDS price over 100 bps because on average he will lose out. If the mechanism is triggered, with .95 probability the LFI is declared adequately capitalized and the CDS price will drop to zero, and with .05 probability the company is declared not adequately capitalized and a 20\% haircut is imposed on the bondholders. In this latter case the CDS will pay 2000 basis points.

\textsuperscript{5} In our model, the government wants to limit the debt that the LFI issues. However, one can also imagine scenarios where the LFI doesn’t want to issue financial debt and the government forces it to issue some in order that the CDS price can be used to assess the risk of default of the systemically relevant debt. Our mechanism works in this case too.
Hence, the expected value of the CDS equals 100. It does not pay the speculator to drive the price above 100 if the expected payoff is only 100. As this example shows, the trigger rule can be designed to reflect the probability of regulatory mistakes and the haircut imposed when these mistakes occur.

One might wonder whether a CDS contract that insures against such a rare event will be actively traded. But the CDS on the U.S. Treasury bonds is very actively traded, while the probability of a default of the U.S. government, which can print its own currency, is quite remote.

Note that the requirement that the regulator, if he finds that the institution is adequately capitalized, must inject some funds serves two purposes. First, it insures the system against regulatory mistakes. If the regulator incorrectly concludes that the company is adequately capitalized, when it is not, the injection of some cash which is pari passu with respect to the existing debt insures that default is less likely. Second, the injection increases the political cost of forbearance. Politically, it is very costly for a regulator to declare a company not adequately capitalized, since the shareholders and the bondholders will actively lobby against it. If he has an easy way out (to declare the company adequately capitalized at no cost), the regulator will likely abuse his discretion. This is the reason we want to make it politically costly to forbear. Having to commit taxpayers’ money has this effect.

4.2 Why CDS?

In the previous section we have shown how to implement a state contingent capital structure in a world where the states are not verifiable by using CDS prices. Most LFIs, however, have several claims traded, for example, bonds or stocks, so why not use one of these other instruments?

One reason for using CDS prices is that it has been shown that the CDS market leads other markets in terms of information discovery. It leads the stock market (Acharya and Johnson (2007)), the bond market (Blanco et al. (2005)), and even the credit rating agencies (Hull et al. (2004)).

We could certainly restate our mechanism in terms of bond prices. Bond issues, however, tends to differ along several dimensions: promised yield, maturity, covenants,
callability, etc. As a result of this lack of standardization, the market for each bond issue tends to be rather illiquid, with most bond issues trading only occasionally. This illiquidity makes bond prices a less reliable indicator of solvency status than CDS prices. In fact, the success of CDSs is mainly due to their standardized nature, which ensures greater liquidity.

Given the size of the stakes at play, one might worry about the temptation for a bank to manipulate its own CDS price. For this reason, and more generally to provide greater transparency, we believe that it is important for CDSs to be traded on an organized exchange, with all the rules that usually apply on such exchanges. There could also be an additional prohibition against firms trading in their own CDSs.

We could use other debt-related market instruments as an alternative, or in addition, to CDSs. For example, Taylor and Williams (2009) use the difference between the Libor rate and the overnight index swap (OIS) as an indicator of the aggregate credit risk of the interbank market. The idea is that the Libor at a certain maturity is a function of both the average of expected future overnight rates over the same maturity and the risk of credit, while the overnight index swap is a function only of the former. A similar indicator can be established for each individual institution. This indicator can replace or supplement the CDS price.

Finally, a rule that says that intervention is triggered whenever the CDS price is above 100 bps for at least 20 of the last 30 trading days will be less subject to manipulation than a rule that says that the CDS price can never go above 100.

Note that, in contrast to the prices of CDSs or other debt related instruments, equity prices are not a good measure of financial distress. While equity is very liquid and its market price hard to manipulate, it does not provide a good indicator of the state of the world for two reasons. First, since equity is insensitive on the downside (because of limited liability) and very sensitive on the upside, a small probability of a positive event can sustain significant equity prices even in the presence of a high probability of default. Hence, high equity prices do not necessarily guarantee that a LFI is not in serious trouble. Second, if we use equity prices as an indicator of the risk of default, bad self-fulfilling equilibria are hard to avoid. With CDS prices, a bad self-fulfilling equilibrium is eliminated by requiring the regulator to determine that the LFI is not adequately
capitalized before taking control. In contrast, with equity, it is difficult to see what regulatory behavior would rule out an optimistic self-fulfilling equilibrium in which equity retains value because the market does not expect the regulator to intervene, and indeed the regulator does not intervene.

4.3 Why Not Short-Term Debt

As an alternative, a trigger strategy could rely on short-term debt. If the initial capital structure includes an amount $STD$ of short-term debt (i.e., debt due at time 1), with $V_4 < STD \leq p_3 V_3 + (1 - p_3)V_4$, then the short-term debt can always be refinanced at time 1, but the interest rate at which it will be refinanced will provide an indication of the probability of bankruptcy. In the model any rate above zero will suggest a possibility of bankruptcy. The problem is that if the regulator were to intervene after observing a refinancing rate bigger than zero, it would be too late to avoid bankruptcy. In fact, suppose $STD = p_3 V_3 + (1 - p_3)V_4$. Then the short-term debt is rolled over with a face value equal to $V_3$. In this case, however, there is no equity left in the firm and thus there is no way for the regulator to avoid bankruptcy at date 2 without injecting government money. If, on the other hand, $STD > p_3 V_3 + (1 - p_3)V_4$, the LFI would be unable to refinance the short-term debt if it faces a negative shock at time 0 and will go into bankruptcy with probability one at time 1.

4.4 How would this rule have worked in the past crisis?

Our mechanism is similar in spirit to the “market-based” regulation underlying Basel 2. The main difference, however, is that we rely on market prices and not on credit rating agencies. As events have shown, the reputational incentives underlying the rating mechanism, which worked very well for more than one hundred years, do not seem to have performed as expected during the last crisis. Would our mechanism have worked better? In answering this question, it is important to appreciate that the CDS prices are endogenous with respect to the default rule we choose. On the one hand, this endogeneity implies that there is no guarantee that CDS prices will perform in the same way as in the past under our proposed rule. On the other hand, the continuous government interventions, which led to the rescue of Bear Stearns, AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America, have certainly affected the reliability of CDS prices as an indicator of the probability of
financial insolvency. To minimize this latter effect we look at CDS prices before 10/14/2008 (i.e., the Paulson rescue of all the major US Banks).

Figure 3a plots the CDS prices for Citigroup and JP Morgan from 1/1/07 to 10/14/08. The prices are in basis points per year and refer to the cost of insuring 5-year debt against the possibility of default. Before July 2007 both banks had CDS prices close to zero: around 8 bps for Citigroup and 16 for JP Morgan. Assuming a loss upon default of 40%, these values correspond to a risk neutral probability of default of between 0.2% and 0.4%: very trivial numbers.

In July 2007 both CDS prices shot up, reaching a maximum of 63 for JPM and 50 for Citi. By the beginning of October they are both in the 30s range. From there on the history diverges. In October Citigroup CDS prices increase and start to be systematically higher than JPMorgan’s ones. They pass the 100 mark on February 8th, 2008 and remained above that level for more than 20 sessions (Figure 3b). By contrast, the JP Morgan CDS, while fluctuating with the Citigroup one, stays mostly below the 100 bps level except for the most severe peaks of the crisis; they would have activated the trigger only in July 2008.

Figure 4a shows a similar plot for the two other major banks: Bank of America and Wells Fargo. Both have trivial CDS prices up to July 2007 and both experience a sharp increase at the beginning of the crisis. Similar to JP Morgan, however, the CDS prices have remained below the 100 bps mark except in the most acute phases of the crisis (Figure 4b). Before the summer of 2008, among these four banks only Citigroup had a CDS price above 100 for more than 20 out of the last 30 consecutive days. Hence, a trigger rule of the type described before would have worked well in singling out Citigroup early on.

To confirm that CDS prices are a good early warning system, in Figures 5 and 6 we look at the CDS prices of institutions that became insolvent. Figure 5 looks at Bear Stearns CDS prices. For Bear the cost of insurance shot above the 100 mark at the beginning of August 2007 and stayed there for more than 30 consecutive days. While it temporarily dropped below that threshold toward the end of September/ beginning of October 2007, after the end of October it was consistently above that threshold, reaching
727 bps just before the JP Morgan rescue. Our trigger rule would have forced Bear to raise equity back in August 2007.

A similar picture emerges for Washington Mutual (Figure 6). The CDS prices shot above 100 at the end of July 2007. Washington Mutual reached the 20 out of 30 sessions above 100 bps in September 2007. Thus, our rule would have forced Washington Mutual to raise equity in September 2007; instead it waited until April 7th 2008, when it raised $7 billion of equity capital. This deleveraging reduced CDS prices from 481 to 321, showing that equity offerings do bring down CDS prices. But the equity offering was insufficient. Eventually, CDS prices went back up and reached 3,350 bps (not shown in the picture since it is out of scale) on 9/15 just before the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) seized WaMu savings bank from WaMu Inc. (the bank holding company) and placed it under the receivership of FDIC, forcing WaMu Inc. to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

While this evidence is only suggestive it does show that CDS prices respond promptly to an increased probability of default and enables us to differentiate between more and less solid institutions. If our rule had been in place all the troubled institutions would have been forced to issue equity one year before they got into trouble.

4.5 Changes in Risk Aversion

A possible objection to our mechanism is that it implicitly assumes that risk aversion is constant. In fact, CDS prices can change not only because of a change in the probability of bankruptcy, but also because of a change in the price of risk (i.e., a change in risk aversion). If we had a good asset pricing model to separate changes in risk aversion from changes in the probability of bankruptcy, it would be very easy to sterilize changes in CDS prices from changes in risk aversion. Imagine, for instance, that changes in the CDS of U.S. Treasury bonds reflect only changes in risk aversion. Then we can adjust the trigger for changes in the price of U.S. Treasury CDS. In practice, however, an asset pricing model of this type does not yet exist (in fact there is not even direct evidence that risk aversion moves) and so such a correction is not possible.

Yet, we do not regard this as a major problem. If the price for risk increases, it means that the welfare cost of a possible bankruptcy increases as well. Hence, the fact
that our mechanism endogenously becomes tighter when the cost of a bankruptcy increases is a positive, not a negative, feature.

4.6 Systemic effects

Our analysis focuses on the LFI insolvency problem from the point of view of an individual institution, ignoring the potential spillover effects that might lead to a systemic crisis. Since government intervention has been mainly justified as a way to minimize systemic effects, it is important to emphasize how our mechanism deals with the systemic dimension.

There are three reasons why the failure of an LFI might have effects on the entire system. First, losses on the credit extended to the insolvent LFI can make other LFIs insolvent. Second, the failure of an LFI can force the immediate liquidation of a large set of assets, depressing their prices and so reducing the assets’ value of other LFIs, possibly triggering other failures. Third, the failure of an LFI has an immediate effect on the amount of financial and human resources dedicated to trading certain assets classes, temporarily reducing the liquidity and hence the value of those assets, with potentially negative effects on other financial institutions. For example, the demise of Drexel led to a collapse in the junk bond market, which exacerbated the Savings and Loan crisis.

Although our analysis is a partial equilibrium one, our mechanism does address the negative systemic effects. In fact, it is able to counteract all three negative feedback loops. First, by insuring that LFIs will be able to pay their debt with probability one, our mechanism eliminates the very root of any systemic problem, since no LFI will become insolvent. Second, our mechanism does not force any asset liquidation, thus avoiding a downward spiral in assets prices. Last but not least, by inducing equityholders to inject more equity in a poorly performing LFI, our mechanism increases the amount of capital invested in the sector, alleviating the shortage which is at the root of many crises.

In this latter respect, our mechanism is related to Kashyap et al (2008). They design a form of insurance contract that increases the availability of risk capital in the case of systemic crisis. The main difference is in the mechanism to make certain states of the world verifiable. Kashyap et al (2008) rely on an aggregate industry profitability measure, while we rely on the individual LFI CDS prices. As a result, their approach is
able to cope only with a systemic crisis, leaving the system exposed to crises like the 
demise of Drexel, which was severe, but not systemic.

Some people might see this latter feature of Kashyap et al (2008) as a virtue, since it 
limits the injection of capital to situations of systemic crisis. Our mechanism, however, 
can easily be modified to achieve the same objective. We can condition intervention not 
just on the CDS price of the institution in question, but also on the CDS prices of other 
major LFIs. In so doing, we can restrict capital injections to systemic crises, where most 
or all the LFIs have high CDS prices.

Last but not least, by making creditors suffer (at least out of equilibrium), our 
mechanism addresses one of the major causes of the crisis: the lack of incentives for 
lenders to be mindful of risk in their lending practices. Any mechanism that eliminates 
such an incentive runs the risk of excessive lending, with the systemic effects this implies.

4.7 Risk of forbearance versus risk of panic

The risk of empowering a regulator with the right to life and death is twofold. On 
the one hand, the regulator can arbitrarily close down perfectly functioning financial 
institutions for political reasons. On the other hand, the regulator, under intense lobbying 
by the regulated, can be too soft, a phenomenon known in the banking literature as 
“regulatory forbearance”. Our mechanism, which bases intervention on a market-based 
signal, removes most of this discretion. The regulator cannot intervene if the market 
prices do not signal a situation of distress and cannot avoid intervention when they do.

While we made mandatory a regulatory intervention in case of high CDS prices, 
we deliberately did not require the regulator to fire the manager and convert debt into 
equity as an automatic consequence of the triggered event. While this discretion may run 
the risk of inducing some regulatory forbearance, it is designed to avoid another risk: of 
self-fulfilling panics. Every time we take away regulatory discretion and rely on market 
signals, we bear the risk of making the wrong decision if market signals are not perfect.

Our mechanism eliminates this risk by leaving the regulator the option to limit her 
intervention to an audit. Clearly, this option reintroduces the risk of regulatory 
forbearance. Nevertheless, we think this risk is substantially reduced with respect to the 
current environment because the regulator has to stick her neck out and assert that a firm
that the market thinks is at risk of default is in fact perfectly safe. This risk is further reduced by the requirement that the regulator must invest some money in the LFI if he declares it to be adequately capitalized. This requirement has several benefits. First, it makes it politically costly for the regulator to forbear. Second, increasing the solvency of the LFI makes bear raids even less profitable, since the CDS price will drop further. Third, it makes the system robust to regulatory mistakes. If the regulator incorrectly concludes that the LFI is adequately capitalized, the LFI’s solvency will be improved by infusing some liquidity.

The regulator faces two types of pressures: the industry pressure to bail out the LFI and the pressure from Congress to minimize the taxpayers’ money at risk. Our choice of making new government debt pari passu tries to balance these opposing forces. On the one hand, we want to make it politically costly for the government to validate as adequately capitalized firms that are not. This cost would be maximized by making the government claim junior with respect to everybody else’s. On the other hand, we want to make it difficult to succumb to the industry pressure to bail out the LFI, which would be very strong if the regulator could inject funds in exchange for a junior claim on the LFI. Pari passu debt strikes a reasonable balance. If the firm is insolvent pari passu debt does help the existing creditors, but it is sufficiently junior to make the government suffer some pain.

One can argue that the government might always change the rules ex post, and waive its obligation to invest money. In this case, however, the underwriter of the CDS contracts would be able to sue the government for damages, since the government behavior would cause their price to rise.

An alternative approach would be to fix a price to insure LFI debt and require a private insurance company to audit the LFI and decide whether or not to insure the debt at that price. If the insurance company accepts the insurance, this supports the idea that the LFI is adequately capitalized; if it does not then we can be confident that the LFI is at risk and the regulator should feel no qualms about taking it over. Unfortunately, such a mechanism would be more likely to fail in a systemic crisis, where more LFIs would be audited and the capacity of any private insurer to absorb risk would be limited.
Some people may view our mechanism as a market-based nationalization. But it is no more a nationalization than is a bankruptcy. And the market-based trigger may provide a political cover for an early intervention, avoiding costly delays. In fact, during the recent crisis the political stigma associated with nationalization has delayed necessary interventions in the banking sector at considerable cost.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, we have proposed a new capital requirement for large financial institutions that are too big to fail. This mechanism is similar to existing capital requirements except that it relies on credit default swaps, instead of the credit rating agencies, as the trigger mechanism. We have shown that this mechanism ensures that LFIs are solvent with probability one, while preserving the disciplinary effects of debt. Credit default swaps have been demonized as one of the main causes of the current crisis. It would be only fitting if they were part of the solution.
References


Figure 3a: Citi and JP Morgan CDS prices leading to the crisis
The plot reports the prices (in basis points per year) of the 5-year credit default swaps on Citigroup and JP Morgan debt starting 1/1/07 to 10/14/08. Source: Bloomberg.

Figure 3b: Citi and JP Morgan CDS prices during the Bear Stearns Crisis (3/14/08) and the Lehman Crisis (9/15/08)
Figure 4a: BofA and Wells Fargo CDS prices leading to the crisis
The plot reports the prices (in basis points per year) of the 5-year credit default swaps on Bank of America and Wells Fargo debt starting 1/1/07 to 10/14/08. Source: Bloomberg.

Figure 4b: BofA and Wells Fargo CDS prices during the Bear Stearns Crisis (3/14/08) and the Lehman Crisis (9/15/08)
**Figure 5: Bear Stearns CDS prices before the rescue**

The plot reports the prices (in basis points per year) of the 5-year credit default swaps on Bear Stearns debt starting 1/1/07 to 10/14/08. Source: Bloomberg.
Figure 6: Washington Mutual CDS prices before receivership

The plot reports the prices (in basis points per year) of the 5-year credit default swaps on Washington Mutual debt starting 1/1/07 to 9/15/08. On that day all the major rating companies downgraded Washington Mutual and the CDS prices shot to 3,350 bps., where they stay until the Office on Thrift Supervision (OTS) seizes WaMu savings bank from WaMu Inc. and places it under the receivership of FDIC, which in turn sells it to JPMorgan Chase. On 9/26/08 WaMu files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. On 10/17/07 WaMu reports 3Q07 results, with 72% loss in profits. On 4/7/08 WaMu raises $7bln of capital (two of which from TPG). Source: Bloomberg.